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INTRODUCTION
President Obama recently warned that "foreign governments, criminal syn-
dicates and lone individuals are probing our financial, energy and public safety
systems every day" and that "in a future conflict, an adversary unable to match
our military supremacy on the battlefield might seek to exploit our computer
vulnerabilities here at home."' Until recently, the technical challenges of identi-
fying and exploiting U.S. computer vulnerabilities impeded all but the most pow-
erful of nations from acquiring such capabilities. These impediments have van-
ished. Now, criminals, terrorists, and rogue nations can simply buy what they
need in a booming online market for the most dangerous exploits of all: weapon-
ized "0day" exploits.
A Oday is a software vulnerability that is unknown to the computer user and
software manufacturer.' The idea is that the software manufacturer has "zero
days" to remedy the vulnerability if a hacker discovers it first and exploits it to
gain unauthorized access to computer systems. Such Oday exploits can also be
weaponized: they can be modified to not only gain access to but also to disrupt,
disable, or destroy computer networks and their components. Armed with
weaponized Oday exploits, attackers have launched cyber operations such as the
"Flame" cyber strikes against Middle Eastern nations and the "Aurora" operation
against Dow Chemical, Northrup Grumman, and other major U.S. corpora-
tions.3 These highly publicized attacks have provided a marketing bonanza for
companies that openly sell Oday exploits on the web, often in weaponized form,
and brag about the effectiveness of their products.4
1. Barack Obama, Taking the Cyberattack Threat Seriously, WALL ST. J., July 19, 2012,
http://online.wsj.com/news/artices/SBloooo872396390444330904577535492693044
650.
2. See What is a Zero-Day Vulnerability?, PC TOOLS, http://www.pctools.com/
security-news/zero-day-vulnerability (last visited Nov. 1, 2013). Some experts in-
stead define a "Oday" as a vulnerability for which there is no patch available. See
Vulnerability Trends, SYMANTEC, http://www.symantec.com/threatreport/topic
.jsp?id=vulnerability-trends &aid=zeroday vulnerabilities (last visited Nov. 26,
2013).
3. Pierluigi Paganini, Cyber-Espionage: The Greatest Transfer of Wealth in History,
INFOSEC INST. (Feb. 12, 2013), http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/cyber
-espionage- the-greatest-transfer-of-wealth-in-history; Emil Protalinski, Google
Aurora Attackers Still at Large, Targeting Mainly US Finance, Energy, and Education
Companies, TNW NEws (Sept. 7, 2012), http://thenextweb.com/insider/2o12/o9/07/
google-aurora-attackers-still-large-targeting-mainly-us-finance-energy-education
-companies.
4. See Nicole Perlroth & David E. Sanger, Nations Buying as Hackers Sell Flaws in Com-
puter Code, N.Y. TIMEs, July 13, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/o7/14/
world/europe/nations-buying-as-hackers-sell-computer-flaws.html; Lucian Con-
stantin, ReVuln Showcases Vulnerabilities in SCADA Software, but Won't Report
Them to Vendors, TECHWORLD (NOV. 22, 2012, 2:30 PM), http://news.
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Criminals buy and use weaponized Oday exploits to steal passwords, intel-
lectual property, and other data through computer exploitation attacks. Terror-
ists or rogue nations can also use weaponized Oday exploits to pose a still greater
threat: that of targeting the applications layer of the industrial control systems on
which the U.S. electric grid and other critical infrastructure sectors depend. Eric
Rosenbach, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy, recently
highlighted the implications of this cyberweapons bazaar for U.S. security. He
explained that the black market for Oday exploits and malware tools, combined
with the proliferation of programs that scan for vulnerabilities in industrial con-
trol systems, are "what worries us the most," because they so dramatically expand
the array of adversaries who can acquire cyberweapons and attack America.5
The Senate Armed Services Committee deserves great credit for raising the
visibility of this proliferating threat and for calling for measures to address it. As
of this writing, section 946 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2014 recommends that the President "establish an interagency process to
provide for the establishment of an integrated policy to control the proliferation
of cyber weapons through unilateral and cooperative export controls, law en-
forcement activities, financial means, diplomatic engagement, and such other
means as the President considers appropriate."6
Yet it remains wholly unclear how such controls should be structured. At one
end of the policy debate, skeptics argue that any effort to curtail the market for
weaponized Oday exploits is doomed to fail because these transactions are intan-
gible and extraordinarily difficult to regulate.7 Regulations may simply drive
sellers onto the underground market. They contend that rather than promulgat-
ing futile regulations, the international community should learn to "coexist" with
this market.' This perspective overlooks the severity of the weaponized Oday ex-
ploit threat and the imperative to develop innovative measures to curb it.
At the other end of the spectrum, a growing number of cybersecurity experts
contend that the companies that write computer software should be held liable
techworld.com/applications/3412614/revuln- showcases-vulnerabilities
-in-scada-software-but-wont-report-them-to-vendors.
5. John Reed, The Cyber Threats Keeping DoD Officials Awake Right Now, FOREIGN
POL'Y (Sept. 13, 2012, 5:35 PM), http://killerapps.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/
09/13/the-cyber-threat-thatskeeping-dod-officials awake right-now.
6. S. 1197, 113th Cong (2013).
7. See James Ball, Secrecy Surrounding 'Zero-day Exploits' Industry Spurs Calls for
Government Oversight, WASH. POST, Sept. 1, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/national-security/secrecy-surrounding-zero-day-exploits-industry-spurs
-calls-for-government-oversight/2012/o9/ol/46d664a6-edf7-lei-afd6-f55f84bcoc4
_story_2.html; Paul Rosenzweig, The Market in Zero-Day Exploits, LAWFARE (July
14, 2013, 1:27 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/o7/the-market-in-zero-day
-exploits.
8. See Ball, supra note 7.
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for damages caused by exploits since defects in their software created the oppor-
tunities for those exploits in the first place.9 However, substantial legal uncertain-
ties surround efforts to establish this liability regime. Imposing liability on the
software industry could also risk unintended economic damage, such as stifling
vital innovation and growth of U.S. software companies.
Instead, we recommend three measures to mitigate the threat posed by Oday
exploits to national security. We focus on what we perceive to be the greatest
danger-that of "weaponized" Oday exploits capable of disrupting control sys-
tems for the electric grid and other critical infrastructure sectors. Weaponized
Oday exploit attacks against these targets are dangerous because they can physi-
cally damage critical infrastructure equipment and disrupt the flow of electricity
and other services vital to the economy, public health and safety, and national
security."o While we are most concerned with Oday exploits that have already
been weaponized, our proposals also address sales of exploits that are capable of
being weaponized.
First, we propose creating additional incentives for industry to eliminate de-
fects in critical infrastructure industrial control systems and applications layer
software. The Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies Act of
2002 (Safety Act) provides an especially promising means to strengthen these in-
centives." The Safety Act grants providers of anti-terrorism technologies signifi-
cant third-party liability protections for claims arising out of, relating to, or re-
sulting from an act of terrorism, if the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
first determines that the technology satisfies key security criteria. 2 Although the
9. See Tom Espiner, Expert: Hold Developers Liable for Flaws, ZDNET (Oct. 14,
2005, 1:37 AM), http://www.zdnet.com/expert-hold-developers-liable-for-flaws
-2039278665; JaikumarVijayan, Hold Vendors Liable for Buggy Software, Group Says,
COMPUTERWORLD (Feb. 16, 2010, 12:05 PM), http://www.computerworld.com/
s/article/9157218/Hold vendorsliablefor buggy-software-groupsays.
io. The damage caused by the rupture of a gasoline pipeline owned by Olympic Pipe-
line Company in Bellingham, Washington-although not caused by a cyberat-
tack-demonstrates the extent of damage that may occur following a weaponized
Oday-exploit attack against critical infrastructure ICS. The rupture caused three
deaths, multiple injuries, $45 million dollars in damage, significant environmental
harm, and the company's bankruptcy. See MARSHALL ABRAMS & JOE WEISS,
BELLINGHAM, WASHINGTON, CONTROL SYSTEM CYBER SECURITY CASE STUDY (2007),
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/fisma/ics/documents/BelinghamCaseStudy
.report%2020Sepo71.pdf; JOE WEISS, ASSURING INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEM (ICS)
CYBER SECURITY 12 (2008), http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/o8o825_cyber.pdf.
11. Pub. L. No. 107-296, n6 Stat. 2238.
12. Frequently Asked Questions, SAFETY ACT, https://www.safetyact.gov/jsplfaq/
samsFAQSearch.do(last visited Oct. 21, 2013).
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Safety Act currently includes "software development services" as one of the prod-
uct categories available for liability protections,'3 the statute must be expanded to
cover critical infrastructure industrial control systems (ICS) and applications
layer software. We recommend that legislators collaborate with DHS and soft-
ware companies to adapt current certification criteria and extend Safety Act cov-
erage into this realm. Implementing this proposal would secure critical infra-
structure from both weaponized Oday-exploit attacks and other types of
malware.
In order to increase the costs associated with selling dangerous Oday exploits
to U.S. adversaries, we also recommend that the international community estab-
lish uniform export controls for these sales. Through the Wassenaar Arrange-
ment on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Tech-
nologies, nations should develop criteria for which Oday-exploit sales should be
authorized and which should be denied, focusing on the end-use and end-desti-
nation of such transactions. While sales of Oday exploits to rogue nations, ter-
rorist organizations, and other entities that target critical infrastructure industrial
control systems and their components must be outlawed, sales to software ven-
dors aiming to rectify vulnerabilities should be granted export license exceptions.
This multilateral effort would constitute an important first step in establishing
international norms on legitimate Oday-exploit purchases.
Finally, it is vital that the United States augment its ability to rigorously pros-
ecute those who sell Oday exploits that target critical infrastructure to U.S. ad-
versaries. If researchers faced a significant risk of prosecution for such sales rather
than continuing to enjoy de facto immunity, many would be deterred from con-
ducting these transactions. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act should be
amended to impose an affirmative duty on sellers to conduct due diligence before
selling Oday exploits that target U.S. critical infrastructure ICS and their appli-
cations layer software.'4 Through this amendment, the United States would be
able to prosecute researchers located both domestically and abroad who reck-
lessly sell dangerous exploits to those who harm us.
Part I describes the mechanics of Oday exploits and some important termi-
nology for understanding this threat. Part II provides an overview of the current
financial incentives and structure of the global Oday-exploit market and some of
the prominent computer firms involved in these transactions. Part III sets forth
our three recommendations for addressing this market. Part IV identifies critical
policy issues that remain unresolved-most notably, the tradeoffs between curb-
ing the Oday-exploit market and the potential benefits for U.S. agencies to be
able to access the unimpeded market that exists today.
13. The SAFETY Act: Risk Managementfor Anti-terrorism Products and Services, SMITH,
GAMBRELL & RUSSELL, LLP, http://www.sgrlaw.com/resources/trustthe-leaders/
leaders issues/1343/1347 (last visited Nov. 30, 2013).
14. Further analysis will be needed to determine the precise definition and scope of
"targeting" under this amended statute.
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I. TERMINOLOGY AND THE MECHANICS OF ODAY EXPLOITS
Before determining how to regulate and curb the weaponized Oday-exploit
market, it is useful to understand the processes of developing and patching Oday
exploits, and to know which Oday exploits are most dangerous. This Part there-
fore provides a broad overview of these mechanics, as well as key terminology.
A "0day vulnerability" is a weakness in software that is unknown to the soft-
ware manufacturer. 5 Since code is highly complex and varies significantly among
software, each Oday vulnerability is unique." However, since many computer
systems deploy the same software, finding a Oday vulnerability in one software
program would empower a hacker to penetrate multiple computer systems.
The ethical response to discovering a Oday vulnerability is to report the flaw
to the software manufacturer. This is called "responsible disclosure."" Once the
software vendor learns of the flaw, the company will issue a security patch, which
rectifies the vulnerability to prevent future exploitation. Accordingly, the "life-
time" of a Oday vulnerability generally includes (1) the vendor learning of the
flaw, (2) the vendor disclosing the nature of the flaw to the public, (3) the vendor
releasing a security patch and (4) the patch being downloaded and installed on
vulnerable systems.'" If the Oday vulnerability is especially dangerous, software
vendors may patch it before disclosing details of the danger to the public, pre-
venting potential attackers from learning about and exploiting the vulnerability.'9
As an alternative to engaging in "responsible disclosure," a researcher could
instead "exploit" or weaponize the Oday vulnerability, and then sell it to third
parties.2 0 Some Oday-exploit sales only enable the buyer to gain unauthorized
15. Vulnerability Trends, supra note 2.
16. See Tim Lloyd, Israeli Cyber-Security Experts Discuss Zero-Day Exploits, Virtual
Money Laundering Techniques, VENTUREBEAT (June 3, 2013, 1:31 PM), http://
venturebeat.com/2013/o6/03/israeli-cyber-security-experts-discuss-zero-day
-exploits-virtual-money-laundering-techniques. For a discussion of software's
complexity, see Gary McGraw, Software [InIsecurity: Modern Malware, INFORMIT
(Mar. 22, 2011), http://www.informit.com/articles/article.aspx?p=1695979.
17. MICHAEL SUTTON & FRANK NAGLE, EMERGING ECONOMIC MODELS FOR VULNERABIL-
ITY RESEARCH 16 (2006), http://weis2oo6.econinfosec.org/docs/17.pdf.
18. LEYLA BILGE & TUDOR DUMITRAS, BEFORE WE KNEW IT: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF
ZERO-DAY ATTACKS IN THE REAL WORLD 3 (2012), http://users.ece.cmu.edu/
-tdumitra/public-documents/bilgel2_zero-day.pdf.
19. See, e.g., ANDREW CENCINI ET AL., SOFTWARE VULNERABILITIES: FULL-, RESPON-
SIBLE-, AND NON-DISCLOSURE 26 (2005), http://courses.cs.washington.edu/courses/
csep590/05au/whitepaper turnin/software vulnerabilitiesby-cencini-yuchan
.pdf.
20. SUTTON & NAGEL, supra note 17, at i; see BILGE & DUMITRAS, supra note 18, at 3.
244
32: 239 2013
CURBING THE MARKET FOR CYBER WEAPONS
access to a computer system and become its "administrator." Other Oday ex-
ploits are "weaponized," or mated with a launch pad, like a botnet, to cause the
computer system to malfunction.2'
Transforming the vulnerability into a weaponized exploit may require sig-
nificant investments of time, money, and resources. Experts estimate that the
time required for the discovery, design, and weaponization can often exceed five
hundred days, depending on the sophistication of the weaponized exploit.2 2 Fur-
thermore, after researchers turn a Oday vulnerability into a weaponized exploit,
they often spend ample time testing the exploit to ensure that it will penetrate or
attack its target covertly.23
Oday exploits are dual-use." They can be deployed by good-willed research-
ers to test computer systems for vulnerabilities and therefore safeguard systems
against attacks. However, they can also be deployed to gather sensitive commer-
cial or intelligence information, incapacitate computer systems, or inflict wide-
spread physical damage. For example, a weaponized Oday exploit targeting the
air-traffic control system could send false signals to planes in the air, causing
them to crash or collide." Department of Transportation audits have confirmed
that the U.S. air-traffic control system remains highly vulnerable to cyberat-
tacks." An attack on the electric grid could leave entire regions of the country in
the dark for weeks, incapacitating the economy and resulting in numerous casu-
alties."
21. A botnet is a network of computers that are taken over by an attacker remotely and
ordered to perform certain functions. Dennis Fisher, What is a Botnet?, KASPERSKY
LAB (Apr. 25, 2013), http://blog.kaspersky.com/botnet.
22. SANDRO GAYCKEN & FELIX F.X. LINDNER, ZERO-DAY GOVERNANCE: AN








26. See Paul Marks, Air Traffic System Vulnerable to Cyber Attack, NEW SCIENTIST (Sept.
12, 2011), http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21128295.6oo-air-traffic-system
-vulnerable-to-cyber-attack.html#.UpVulmTk8oM.
27. See David Perera, FAA Air Traffic Control Systems Open to Possible Cyber Attack,
Says IG, FIERCEGOVERNMENTIT (Sept. 7, 2010), http://www.fiercegovernmentit
.com/story/faa-air-traffic-control-systems-open-possible-cyber-attack-says-ig/
2010-09-08.
28. See Antone Gonsalves, Damage From Attack on Power Grid Would Surpass Sandy,
CSO MAG. ONLINE (Nov. 29, 2012), http://www.csoonline.com/article/
722579/damage-from-attack-on-power-grid-would-surpass-sandy.
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As the threats to the air-traffic control system and electric grid make clear,
the most potent and dangerous Oday-exploit attacks are those that target the na-
tion's "critical infrastructure" sectors. The 2013 Presidential Policy Directive on
Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience defines critical infrastructure as
"systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that
the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating
impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety,
or any combination of those matters." 9 The air-traffic control system and other
transportation systems are considered critical infrastructure, along with the
chemical, communications, emergency services, financial, water, power, and nu-
clear reactor sectors.30
A high percentage of America's critical infrastructure is owned and operated
by private civilian companies. 3' These companies generally operate and monitor
critical infrastructure by relying on industrial control systems (ICS), including
Supervisory Control and Data Analysis (SCADA) systems, distributed-control
systems, and programmable-logic controllers.32 These systems enable companies
to open and shut water pump valves, react to pressure, and change volume levels
automatically and remotely.33 As technology has evolved, companies have sought
to improve operational efficiency by designing ICS systems that are Internet
compatible. 34 Internet connectivity has rendered these systems and their applica-
tions layer much more susceptible to Oday-exploit attacks since perpetrators can
access and penetrate them more easily.35 Today's Oday-exploit attacks are espe-
cially targeted at the vulnerable applications layer.36
29. Directive on Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, 2013 DAILY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 92 (Feb. 12 2013).
30. Critical Infrastructure Sectors, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
http://www.dhs.gov/critical-infrastructure-sectors (last visited May 15, 2013).
31. Glenn Derene, How Vulnerable is U.S. Infrastructure to a Major Cyber Attack?,
POPULAR MECHANICS (Oct. 1, 2009, 12:oo AM), http://www.popularmechanics
.com/technology/military/43o7521.
32. ICS: Industrial Control Systems Security, SANS ICS, http://ics.sans.org/ (last visited
Oct. 19, 2013).
33. See WEISS, supra note lo; William T. Shaw, SCADA System Vulnerabilities to Cyber
Attack, ELECTRIC ENERGY ONLINE, http://www.electricenegyonline.com/?page
=showarticle&article=18i (last visited May 16, 2013).
34. See Cyber Threats to SCADA Networks, UNICRI, http://www.unicri.it/special
topics/cyberjthreats/cyber-crime/explanations/scada (last visited May 15, 2013);
Save Money with Innovative SCADA Solutions, INDUS. CONTROL LINKS, http://
www.iclinks.com/SCADA-Value (last visited Nov. 23, 2013).
35. Cyber Threats, supra note 34.
36. See SECUNIA, SECUNIA VULNERABILITY REVIEW 2013: KEY FIGURES AND FACTS FROM A
GLOBAL IT-SECURITY PERSPECTIVE 5 (2012), http://secunia.com/?action=fetch&
filename= SecuniaVulnerabilityReview_2ol3.pdf; SYMANTEC, INTERNET SECURITY
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In spite of this increased threat, private companies have failed to adequately
invest in cyber measures to secure critical infrastructure from attack. The gov-
ernment has also failed to provide sufficient support to private companies to safe-
guard the nation's critical infrastructure. According to the Department of Home-
land Security's recent Inspector General Report, the United States Computer
Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) is "understaffed" and lacks the legal au-
thority to require private companies to implement stronger protections against
cyber intrusions."
II. THE MARKET FOR ODAY EXPLOITS
The market for Oday exploits has "exploded" in recent years due to the rise
of cybercrime and nations' increased recourse to offensive cyber operations and
cyber espionage.38 In the past, computer researchers voluntarily reported vulner-
abilities in software that they discovered to software vendors. Vendors therefore
lacked the incentive to pay researchers for their discoveries and instead publicly
acknowledged them when issuing security patches or organized events honoring
them for their work.39 Today, while public recognition or benevolence may per-
suade some researchers to report their findings to software vendors, many are
instead motivated by the substantial profits available by selling their discoveries
to governments and other customers with "deeper pockets." 4o
The Oday-exploit market currently consists of three categories: the white
market, in which so-called "white-hat" vulnerability researchers sell Odays to
software vendors or other companies that help the developers rectify security
flaws; the black market, where researchers sell Oday exploits, often in weaponized
form, to criminal organizations; and the intermediate "gray market," where re-
searchers sell Oday exploits, also frequently in weaponized form, to government
agencies and other buyers seeking to deploy them for offensive purposes. 41
THREAT REPORT APPENDIX 87 (2013), http://docsforssl.com/docs/symantec/
b-istr appendices_vi8_2012_221284438.en-us.pdf.
37. The Unreadiness Team, WASH. POsT, June 20, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost
.com/wp-dyn/content/article/201o/o6/19/AR20o10o619o2645.html.
38. See Andy Greenberg, Shopping for Zero-Days: A Price List for Hackers' Secret Soft-
ware Exploits, FORBES (Mar. 23, 2012, 9:43 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
andygreenberg/2o12/o3/23/shopping-for-zero-days-an-price- list-for-hackers
-secret-software-exploits; Zero-Day Market, the Governments are the Main Buyers,
SECURITY AFF. (May 21, 2013), http://securityaffairs.colwordpress/14561/malware/
zero-day-market-governments-main-buyers.html.
39. SUTTON & NAGEL, supra note 17, at 12-17.
40. Greenberg, supra note 38.
41. Robert Lemos, Private Market Growing for Zero-Day Exploits and Vulnerabilities,
SEARCHSECURITY.COM, http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/Private-
market-growing-for-zero-day-exploits-and-vulnerabilities (last visited Nov. 30,
2013).
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In response to the compensation offered to vulnerability researchers by other
buyers, software companies were induced to begin paying researchers for their
discoveries in the white market-either through direct payments or exploit com-
petitions.42 For example, the Zero Day Initiative is a program designed to reward
security researchers for "responsible disclosure" of flaws to software vendors. 43
Recently, Facebook and Microsoft collaborated to create "HackerOne," a bug
bounty initiative that offers researchers $300 to $5,000 for a given vulnerability."
Yet most software vendors still provide inadequate compensation to com-
pete with buyers in the gray and black markets. 45 For example, a researcher or
firm could sell a newly discovered exploit to a software company in the white
market for approximately $300 to $5,ooo, or it could earn "io or even ioo times"
that amount by selling the exploit to a government agency or criminal organiza-
tion.4* White-hat researchers are therefore motivated not only by financial com-
pensation but also by morals.47
In stark contrast to the white market, there is an anarchic black market for
Oday exploits where vulnerability researchers often sell exploits to criminal hack-
ers, terrorist organizations, and rogue nations. Vulnerability researchers have de-
scribed this market as a "Wild West, where legality is rarely of paramount im-
portance."*' The transactions occur in "invite-only" chat rooms, in which
researchers sell weaponized exploit toolkits to the highest-paying buyer.49 Ac-
cording to Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy Eric Rosen-
bach, the black market is facilitated by recently developed Google-like search en-
gines, which enable users to locate computer systems connected to the Internet
and find software weaknesses."o Many of the websites used for these transactions,
42. Id.
43. Id.; Why Did We Create the Zero Day Initiative?, ZERO DAY INITIATIVE, http://www
.zerodayinitiative.com/about (last visited Feb. 1, 2013).
44. Stephanie Mlot, Facebook, Microsoft Launch Internet Bug Bounty Program, PC MAG.
(Nov. 7, 2013, 3:20 PM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/o,2817,2426877,oo
.asp?mailinglD=64A8C50555Eo8B9EEF2B5C437F5E32.
45. See Taylor Armerding, Facebook Locks in on Bounties for Security, NETWORKWORLD
(June 5, 2012, 7:37 AM), http://www.networkworld.com/news/2012/o60412
-facebook-locks-in-on-bounties-259854.html?page=i; Lemos, supra note 41.
46. See SuTToN & NAGEL, supra note 17, at 12; Greenberg, supra note 38; Mlot, supra
note 44.
47. See Lemos, supra note 41.
48. Gallagher, supra note 24.
49. Michael Riley & Ashlee Vance, Cyber Weapons: The New Arms Race, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (July 20, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/printer/articles/54o
-cyber-weapons-the-new- arms-race.
50. Reed, supra note 5.
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such as the "Silk Road" website recently shut down by the FBI, are located on the
underground "Deep Web" and concealed from traditional search engines."
In between the white and anarchic black markets for Oday exploits, there is
an unregulated, burgeoning gray market, where bona fide companies sell Oday
exploits to government agencies and other unreported customers." Many of
these companies serve as brokers-they purchase Oday exploits from outside re-
searchers and then resell them to customers at higher prices." Other gray market
firms develop and weaponize Oday exploits "exclusively from in-house research
efforts."5
The largest customers include the U.S. government and other nations' gov-
ernment agencies, which are often willing to expend $250,000 for a single Oday
exploit.5 The Washington Post reported that the U.S. National Security Agency
spent $25 million on exploit purchases in 2013 alone.56 U.S. law enforcement
agencies frequently purchase Oday exploits to disrupt criminal operations and
"sneak spy software onto suspects' computers or mobile phones."57 Other prom-
inent buyers allegedly include the governments of Brazil, Britain, India, Israel,
Malaysia, North Korea, Russia, and Singapore.' Governments and other clientele
that purchase vulnerability information in the gray market often seek to exploit
the information for offensive operations or espionage missions. Therefore, alt-
hough it would be in civilian computer users' best interest to disclose the vulner-
ability to software vendors so that they could issue patches, intelligence agencies
51. Ryan W. Neal, What You Need to Know About the Silk Road Black Market,
DAILYFINANCE (Oct. 3, 2013, 11:4o AM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2013/10/
03/silk- road-black-market-deep-web -site-what-to-know.
52. See Gallagher, supra note 24.
53. Aarti Shahani, Hacking and the Value of a Zero Day, MARKETPLACE TECH (Oct. 7,
2013), http://www.marketplace.org/topics/tech/hacking-and-value-zero-day#story
-content.
54. Vupen Exclusive & Sophisticated Exploits for Offensive Security, VUPEN SECURITY,
http://www.vupen.com/english/services/lea-index.php (last visited Oct. 10, 2013).
55. Greenberg, supra note 38; see Zero-Day Market, supra note 38.
56. Brian Fung, The NSA Hacks Other Countries by Buying Millions ofDollars' Worth of
Computer Vulnerabilities, WASH. POST, Aug. 31, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost
.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2o13/o8/31/the-nsa-hacks-other-countries-by-buying-
millions-of-dollars-worth-of-computer-vulnerabilities.
57. Nick Farrell, Zero-Day Black Market Bolstered by 'Malware Industrial Complex,'
TECHEYE.NET (Feb. 14, 2013, 11:o6 AM), http://news.techeye.net/security/zero-day
-black-market-bolstered-by-malware-industrial-complex; see Shahani, supra note
53-
58. Perlroth & Sanger, supra note 4.
249
YALE LAW& POLICY REVIEW
withhold the information from the public.59 Such policies have unleashed wide-
spread criticism, with many condemning Oday-exploit sales as "security for the
However, the more grave concern is that in the absence of market regulation,
bona fide companies are legally selling weaponized Oday exploits to rogue gov-
ernments and other entities seeking to harm the United States and its allies. 6' For
example, the Malta-based company ReVuln advertises that it discovers and sells
weaponized Oday exploits that allow attackers to "remotely execute arbitrary
code, download arbitrary files, execute arbitrary commands, open remote shells
or hijack sessions on systems running the vulnerable SCADA software."" The
company, whose motto declares "invincibility lies in the defense[,] the possibility
of victory in the attack," operates legally and is registered at the Malta Registry of
Companies. 63 ReVuln sells to "world-wide" customers and the company's co-
founder, Donato Ferrante, openly acknowledges, "I don't see bad guys or good
guys ... [iut's just business."4 He contends that his firm cannot be held account-
able for cyberattacks because it merely sells information and "the way the infor-
mation is used is up to the customer; it's not up to us.""> The company purport-
edly sells Oday exploits that target ICS software used by General Electric,
Schneider Electric, Siemens, and many major U.S. critical infrastructure sec-
tors.66 On its website, the company boasts that one of its senior researchers has
discovered the greatest number of security vulnerabilities in SCADA software6 7
Another high-profile company operating in the gray market is the French-
based Vupen. Although Vupen at least restricts its sales to NATO nations or allies
that are not subject to United States, European Union, or United Nations sanc-
tions," this screening policy is still far too lenient to safeguard critical U.S. infra-
structure from attack. Under its policy, nations such as Russia, Kazakhstan, and
59. See Dan Auerbach & Lee Tien, Dangerously Vague Cybersecurity Legislation Threat-
ens Civil Liberties, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (March 20, 2012), https://www.eff.org/
deeplinks/2012/o3/dangerously-vague-cybersecurity-legislation.
60. Id.
61. Gallagher, supra note 24.
62. Constantin, supra note 4.
63. REVULN, http://revuln.com/about.php?id=company (last visited Mar. 15, 2013).
64. Tom Gjelten, In Cyberwar, Software Flaws Are a Hot Commodity, NPR NEws (Feb.
12, 2013, 3:25 AM), http://www.npr.org/2013/2/12/171737191/in-cyberwar-software
-flaws-are-a-hot-commodity.
65. Id.
66. Constantin, supra note 4.
67. REVULN, supra note 63.
68. Mike Wheatley, NSA Keeps Its Hands Clean, Buys Zero-Day Vulnerabilities from
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Bahrain can purchase weaponized Oday exploits,6 9 even though the Russian gov-
ernment is a leading sponsor and perpetrator of cyberattacks against other na-
tions. Even though Vupen's screening protocols officially preclude direct sales to
countries like Iran or North Korea, Vupen's customers could foreseeably resell
weaponized Oday exploits to rogue nations seeking to harm America.7 o Critics
have therefore condemned the company for being the "modern-day merchants
of death" and selling "the bullets for cyberwar." 7'
III. ADDRESSING THE 0DAY-EXPLOIT MARKET
To help guide U.S. policymakers as they consider how to address the threat
of weaponized Oday exploits to critical infrastructure, we propose a three-
pronged strategy. First, the United States should address the threat's root cause
by incentivizing developers of critical infrastructure ICS and applications layer
software to enhance their products' security. To ensure that efforts to augment
software security do not inadvertently stifle innovation, Congress should amend
the Safety Act to extend coverage for developers of critical infrastructure ICS and
applications layer software. Second, the international community should develop
criteria for "illegitimate" Oday-exploit sales and establish uniform export con-
trols through the Wassenaar Arrangement. Finally, the United States should
strengthen its capacity to prosecute individuals who sell Oday exploits targeting
critical infrastructure to U.S. adversaries.
A. Leveraging the Safety Act to Incentivize Software Security and Innovation
A robust solution to the cyber threat must entail improving the security of
critical infrastructure ICS and applications layer software. Investing in stronger
security would undermine researchers' ability to discover and weaponize Odays
to inflict widespread destruction.72
Some security experts and scholars argue that, in order to strengthen incen-
tives for software companies to invest in this fashion, software companies should
be held liable when their products are compromised." Proponents of this ap-
french-firm-vupen; see Matthew J. Schwartz, NSA Contracted With Zero-Day Ven-
dor Vupen, INFORMATIONWEEK (Sept. 17, 2013, 1o19 AM), http://www.information-
week.com/security/government/nsa-contracted-with-zero-day-vendor-vupe/
240161389.




73. See Kevin R. Pinkney, Putting Blame Where Blame Is Due: Software Manufacturer
and Customer Liability for Security-Related Software Failure, 13 ALB. L.J. ScI. & TECH.
43, 82 (2002); Frances E. Zollers et al., No More Soft Landings for Software: Liability
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proach reason that although software insecurity is the "root cause" of all cyberat-
tacks, software companies currently evade all liability by including standard ex-
culpatory clauses in their contracts with consumers.74 Most other industries that
manufacture potentially dangerous products, including the car and toy manu-
facturing industries, are frequently held liable when defects in their products in-
flict harm.75 If developers of critical infrastructure ICS and applications layer soft-
ware also feared confronting a multi-billion dollar lawsuit following a
cyberattack, they might be compelled to invest in stronger security.
However, it is uncertain whether extending liability to such companies is fea-
sible, much less desirable. Companies may not fear liability because they may
frequently succeed at undermining plaintiffs' prima facie case that their products
"caused" the damage resulting from cyberattacks.76 A cyberattack against critical
infrastructure involves a number of diverse and potentially culpable parties, in-
cluding the attacker, the developers of the weaponized Oday exploit, the hard-
ware designer, the software developer, the vendors, and the maintainers of critical
infrastructure.? Developers of critical infrastructure ICS and applications layer
software could therefore contend, for example, that a cyberattack succeeded not
because their software was defective, but rather because of the maintainer's neg-
ligence.
In addition to these challenges, our particular concern is that initiatives to
enhance software security must not stifle innovation. If writing software exposed
programmers to liability, they would be reluctant to risk developing newer, and
potentially better, products.7' Developing new software would be especially risky
for Defects in an Industry That Has Come of Age, 21 SANTA CLARA COMP. & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 745, 746 (2005); Bruce Schneier, Liability and Security, CRYPTO-GRAM
NEWSL. (Apr. 15, 2002), https://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0204.html; Vi-
jayan, supra note 9.
74. See Reid Skibell, The Phenomenon of Insecure Software in A Security-Focused World,
8 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 107, 124-25 (2003); David Banisar, Save the Net, Sue a Software
Maker, SECURITYFOCUS (Dec. 17, 2001), http://www.securityfocus.com/
columnists/47; Jonathan Dowdall, Florian Walther's One-Shot Cyber-Security Solu-
tion, POLICYMIC (Nov. 24, 2011), http://www.policymic.com/articles/2566/florian
-walther-s-one-shot-cyber-security-solution.
75. See Banisar, supra note 74.
76. For an analysis of available defenses to strict products liability claims, see in general
Gary D. Spivey, Products Liability: Contributory Negligence or Assumption ofRisk as
Defense Under Doctrine of Strict Liability in Tort, 46 A.L.R.3d 240 (1972).
77. See Robert W. Hahn & Anne Layne-Farrar, The Law and Economics of Software Se-
curity, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 283, 328-29 (2006).
78. TYLER MOORE, PROCEEDINGS OF A WORKSHOP ON DETERRING CYBERATTACK:
INFORMING STRATEGIES AND DEVELOPING OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 10 (2010).
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because, due to software's complexity, "vulnerabilities are inherently embedded
in software architecture." 9
To incentivize industry without risking adverse effects on software innova-
tion, we propose that developers of critical infrastructure ICS and applications
layer software should have the opportunity to receive liability protections under
an amended version of the Safety Act. Congress enacted the Safety Act following
September uth to ensure that liability concerns would not deter companies from
developing technologies that mitigate the consequences of terrorism."o In ex-
change for demonstrating that their "anti-terrorism" products are highly safe and
effective, companies may receive significant liability protections." Protection
varies depending on whether products receive "designation" or "certification" as
Qualified Anti-Terrorism Technology (QATT). For example, QATT "designa-
tion" provides companies with a liability cap in the event of a terrorist event,
assurance of exclusive action in federal court, and protection from punitive dam-
ages and joint and severable liability.82 Applicants must purchase liability insur-
ance in the amount of the liability cap determined by DHS. 3 If companies satisfy
a higher safety threshold and receive "certification" as QATT, DHS immunizes
them from all liability in terrorist-related claims.84
A few law firms and policymakers have recently recommended leveraging the
Safety Act to incentivize companies to strengthen their cybersecurity." However,
they have failed to consider the importance of extending Safety Act coverage to
developers of critical infrastructure ICS and applications layer software. Under
current law, only "anti-terrorism" technologies-defined as technologies "de-
signed, developed, modified, or procured for the specific purpose of preventing,
detecting, identifying, or deterring acts of terrorism"-are eligible for liability
protections.86 Since the primary purpose of critical infrastructure ICS and appli-
cations layer software is to operate and monitor critical infrastructure equip-
ment, such software would not qualify for coverage. Given that this software's
79. Taiwo A. Oriola, Bugs for Sale: Legal and Ethical Proprieties of the Market in Software
Vulnerabilities, 28 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 451, 465-67 (2011).





85. See, e.g., Rachel King, Companies Look to Safety Act to Limit Legal Liability in Cyber
Attacks, WALL. ST. J. (May 2, 2013, 9:16 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2ol3/o5/
02/COmpanies-look-to-safety-act-to-limit-legal-liability-in-cyber-attacks; Cyber
Sticks and Carrots: How the NIST Cybersecurity Framework, Incentives, and the
SAFETY Act Affect You, VENABLE, LLP (Sept. 25, 2013), http://www.venable
com/cyber-sticks-and-carrots-how-the-nist-cybersecurity-framework
-incentives-and- the-safety-act-affect-you-o9-25-2013.
86. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 12.
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security is just as vital to the nation's ability to defend against cyberterrorism, its
developers should also be able to utilize the statute's safety incentives. To achieve
this goal, one approach would be for DHS to collaborate with the software in-
dustry and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to develop
"safety" benchmarks for determining whether applicants' software warrants pro-
tection.87
In addition to receiving liability protections, developers of critical infrastruc-
ture ICS and applications layer software that invest in security and receive Safety
Act approval will also benefit from strengthened brand image. They will be able
to place a DHS-approved Safety Act seal on their software, informing customers
that DHS conducted a comprehensive review and determined that their software
is "effective, reliable, and safe.""8 The seal will be a substantial "market differen-
tiator" because it will guarantee that the software company is the only "entity that
may be sued for damages to third parties."'9 Critical infrastructure owners who
purchase the software will be immune from liability.90 With such marketing ben-
efits, many software companies would be enticed to invest in security and apply
for Safety Act coverage. Incentivizing investments in security would help mitigate
the threats posed by both weaponized Oday exploits and other types of malware
to critical infrastructure.
Although inducing software companies to invest in stronger safety would re-
duce defects and make it harder to discover and weaponize Oday exploits, latent
vulnerabilities would inevitably remain. Therefore, efforts to expand the Safety
Act to promote security must be accompanied by robust efforts at the interna-
tional and domestic levels to regulate Oday-exploit sales targeting critical infra-
structure. We turn next to demonstrating how multilateral export controls
adopted through the Wassenaar Arrangement, and subsequently implemented at
the domestic level, could raise the costs of selling dangerous Oday exploits while
permitting white-hat researchers to continue to operate.
87. In Executive Order 13636, President Obama assigned NIST to collaborate with key
stakeholders to develop a voluntary framework for addressing cybersecurity threats
to critical infrastructure. NIST has convened multiple workshops to achieve this
objective and released a Preliminary Cybersecurity Framework, which can help
guide the development of Safety Act benchmarks. See Cybersecurity Framework,
NIST (Feb. 12, 2013), http://www.nist.gov/itl/cyberframework.cfm.
88. See Safety Act Certified, PREPARED RESPONSE, INC., http://www.preparedresponse
.com/DHS-SAFETY-Act.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2013); Safety Act, HUNTON &
WILLIAMS LLP, http://www.hunton.com/SAFETYAct (last visited Sept. 1, 2013).
89. Dismas Locaria, SAFETYAct: A Cybersecurity Win-Win For Gov't, Industry, LAW36o
(Apr. 24, 2013, 3:20 PM), http://www.law36o.com/articles/43558o/safety-act-a
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B. Implementing Domestic and International Export Controls of Oday Sales
through the Wassenaar Arrangement
Instituting export controls for Oday-exploit sales-and thus requiring cer-
tain gray market sellers of dangerous exploits to obtain licenses from the Depart-
ment of Commerce-would provide another hurdle to selling dangerous exploits
to those seeking to target the United States. As of this writing, section 946 of the
proposed National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 (NDAA) en-
visions establishing such export controls to curb the proliferation of cyberwea-
ponry.9'
Yet before export controls are established, there must be criteria for deter-
mining which sales should be authorized and which should be denied. This is
crucial because given the dual-use nature of Oday exploits, not all sales should be
prevented. Sales by white-hat researchers for purely "defensive purposes" should
not be subject to the same stringent controls as those designed to incapacitate
critical infrastructure systems. Indeed, the Senate Armed Services Committee
acknowledges in its accompanying report to the NDAA that there is a need to
develop "definitions and categories for controlled cyber technologies" that can
guide export controls.92
While the proposed NDAA requires establishing an interagency process to
identify which types of cyberweapons sales should be controlled either "unilater-
ally or cooperatively with other countries," we believe that developing this list
multilaterally is the only viable option.93 The "Wild West" market for Oday ex-
ploits transcends national boundaries. A unilateral American effort to develop a
list of "acceptable" and "unacceptable" transactions would provoke backlash and
fail to secure much-needed international support.
We therefore recommend that the United States collaborate with the inter-
national community to develop export control criteria through the Wassenaar
Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods
and Technologies.94 Established in 1996, the Wassenaar Arrangement is a multi-
lateral export control regime that aims to "contribute to regional and interna-
tional security and stability, by promoting transparency and greater responsibil-
ity in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies, thus




94. See David Fidler, Zero-Sum Game: The Global Market for Software Exploits, ARMs
CONTROL L. (July 18, 2013), http://armscontrollaw.com/tag/zero-day-exploits.
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preventing destabilizing accumulations."95 The arrangement, which currently in-
cludes forty-one member nations,96 strives to achieve this objective by establish-
ing uniform "control lists" of dual-use technologies, sharing information on
dual-use transfers, and consulting with members on national export policies and
denials of export license applications.97 Members compile the control lists collec-
tively and are encouraged to implement corresponding controls through domes-
tic export licenses.9'
A key benefit of utilizing the Wassenaar Arrangement to curb dangerous
Oday exploit sales is that nations would be able to address this rapidly proliferat-
ing market much more quickly than if they had to enter into a new cyberspace
arrangement. Entering into a new cyberspace agreement would involve signifi-
cant political and organizational hurdles and may take years to operationalize. 99
With the Wassenaar Arrangement, the infrastructure, procedures, and guidelines
are already in place to create uniform export controls on dangerous Oday ex-
ploits.
Furthermore, the Wassenaar Arrangement already provides for controls of
"intangible technology," which members have agreed are "critical to the credibil-
ity and effectiveness of [a Participating State's] domestic export control re-
gime."' The Arrangement defines "intangible technology" as "specific infor-
mation necessary for the 'development,' 'production' or 'use' of a product,"
including "technical data or technical assistance."' Selling technical knowledge
on how to exploit vulnerabilities in computer software aptly falls under this def-
inition."o2
95. Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use
Goods and Technologies: Initial Elements, § I.1, July 12, 1996, http://www
.wassenaar.org/docs/IE96.html; Introduction, WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT,
http://www.wassenaar.org/introduction/index.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2013).
96. Frequently Asked Questions, WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT, http://www.wassenaar
.org/faq (last visited Nov. 28, 2013).
97. Jamil Jaffer, Strengthening the Wassenaar Export Control Regime, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L.
519, 520 (2002).
98. See Lillian V. Blageff, Nonproliferation Export Controls on Weapons ofMass Destruc-
tion and Related Technologies, 22 INT'LQ. (2010).
99. See James Lewis, A Cybersecurity Treaty Is a Bad Idea, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.
(June 8, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/debate-club/should-there-be-an
-international-treaty-on-cyberwarfare/a-cybersecurity-treaty-is-a-bad-idea.
ioo. Best Practices for Implementing Intangible Transfer of Technology Controls,
WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT (2006), http://www.wassenaar.org/guidelines/docs/ITT
BestPracticesjfor-public statement.pdf.
101. Id.
102. Odays are often comprised of changeable code that is uninstantiated, meaning that




CURBING THE MARKET FOR CYBER WEAPONS
As Wassenaar members develop criteria for export controls of Odays, we
strongly recommend that they focus on the exploit's end-use, end-purchaser, and
country of destination. Although sales of dangerous exploits to terrorist organi-
zations, rogue states, and other entities seeking to target critical infrastructure
must be denied, controls must not impede legitimate white-hat researchers from
selling exploits to software vendors.
The United States should implement the Wassenaar Arrangement's recom-
mended exploit controls through its Commerce Control List (CCL). 03 Since
Oday exploits would constitute "controlled items" and receive an Export Classi-
fication Number, sellers would need to apply for licenses with the Department of
Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS).10 4 To ensure that this licens-
ing regime does not impose excessive regulatory burdens on white-hat research-
ers, BIS should create and make available a license exception to those who export
exploits to software vendors and other categories of pre-authorized entities in
approved countries of destination.' 5 Sellers with license exceptions would still be
responsible for conducting due diligence and screening end-users. If they failed
to do so, they would be subject to substantial administrative or criminal penal-
ties.' Nevertheless, an export exception would enable them to sell their discov-
eries to vendors quickly, thereby minimally impacting their business operations
and facilitating timely security patches.
In addition to enumerating specific categories of 0day exploits on the Was-
senaar Arrangement's and CCL's controlled items lists, member nations could
?topic=%2Fcom.ibm.spss.modeler.help%2Ftypenode-instantiation.htm (last vis-
ited Oct. 19, 2013). They are difficult to characterize, particularly when mated with
launch pads. Since the Wassenaar Arrangement defines intangible technology in
terms of technical data that is instantiated and can be verified, further analysis will
be needed to determine how to apply its controls to Odays. However, the fact that
the Arrangement already governs certain code and encryption software indicates
that such application is feasible. See Mark T. Pasko, Re-Defining National Security
in the Technology Age: The Encryption Export Debate, 26 J. LEGIS. 337, 341-42 (2000).
103. For an overview of the Commerce Control List, see Overview of U.S. Export Control
System, U.S. DEP'T STATE, http://www.state.gov/strategictrade/overview/ (last vis-
ited Sept. 11, 2013).
104. See 5 C.F.R. § 732.1 (2012); Jordan Collins, Same Laws, Different Century: The Bureau
of Industry & Security's Role in Global Trade & National Security, 15 CURRENTS: INT'L
TRADE L.J. 108, 11o (2006).
105. "Pre-authorized entities" may include certain governments. For further analysis,
see infra Part IV. For a detailed analysis of how export control exceptions may re-
duce regulatory barriers in other contexts, see Joseph A. Schoorl, Clicking the "Ex-
port" Button: Cloud Data Storage and U.S. Dual- Use Export Controls, 80 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 632, 642-52 (2012). See also 15 C.F.R. § 740 (2013).
106. Telephone Interview with Robert Shaw, Exp. Instructor, Monterey Inst. of Int'l
Studies (Oct. 7, 2013).
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also curb dangerous sales through export "catch-all" provisions.o 7 These provi-
sions are defined as controls that "provide a legal and/or regulatory basis to re-
quire government permission to export unlisted items when there is reason to
believe such items are intended for a WMD/Missile end-use or end-user."o10 Due
to the rapidly evolving nature of technologies and discoveries of new vulnerabil-
ities, the international community may be unable to immediately incorporate
newly discovered Odays into their control lists. A catch-all provision for danger-
ous cyberweaponry sales would therefore provide a critical safety net in the Oday-
exploit context.o9
Some might counter that it is impractical to control "intangible" data trans-
fers like Oday exploits. However, the government has successfully limited exports
of dangerous technical data for years under the Export Administration Regula-
tions (EAR) and International Traffic in Arms Regulations."0 It is indisputable
that it has the statutory authority to regulate information that can be deployed in
the "development," "production," or "use" of prohibited defense materials."' For
107. Catch-all provisions are similar to export license exceptions. If the exporter pos-
sesses "knowledge or reason-to-know that an otherwise uncontrolled item will sup-
port a proscribed end-use, then the exporter must apply for an export license, re-
gardless of the technical characteristics of the item." Id.
108. Catch-All Controls, U.S. DEP'T STATE, http://www.state.gov/strategictradel
practices/c43179.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2013).
1o9. Public Statement, WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT (Dec. 12, 2002), http://www
.wassenaar.org/publicdocuments/2002/publicl2l2o2.html; Toli Welihozkiy, Catch-
All Controls, U.S. DEP'T ENERGY, http://www.paei.org/
o7BuildingWeaponsofMassDestruction/o4Catch-AllControls.pdf (last visited Sept.
29, 2013). For current "catch-all" provisions in the EAR, see 15 C.F.R. §§ 744.2, .3, .4
(2012); Overview of U.S. Export Control System, U.S. DEP'T STATE 19-21,
http://www.state.gov/strategictrade/overview (last visited Sept. 11, 2013). Effective
enforcement of catch-all provisions will require strong collaboration between in-
telligence agents and law enforcement officials. They will need to collect sufficient
evidence to demonstrate that the exporter knew or had reason to know that the
exploit would be deployed for a prohibited end-use. See Telephone Interview with
Robert Shaw, supra note 1o6.
no. See Robert A. Borich Jr., Globalization of the U.S. Defense IndustrialBase: Developing
Procurement Sources Abroad Through Exporting Advanced Military Technology, 31
PUB. CONT. L.J. 623, 641-43 (2002); Collins, supra note 104, at no-i; Pasko, supra
note 102, at 337, 350.
Ill. 15 C.F.R. § 772.1 (2012). "Technical data" subject to export controls may take "a
tangible form, such as a model, prototype, blueprint, or an operating manual" or
an "intangible form such as technical services." Id. The Arms Export Control Act
provides the President with the power, "in furtherance of world peace and the se-
curity and foreign policy of the United States . . . to control the import and the
export of defense articles" and related services, including dangerous technical data.
See 22 U.S.C.A. § 2778 (a) (I) (West 2012); United States v. Edler Indus., Inc., 579
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example, pursuant to these statutes, the government prevents individuals and
universities from training or sharing information with foreigners on how to de-
velop a nuclear weapon, missiles, and other dangerous technologies."' The "in-
tangible" electronic or digital transmission of "blueprints, diagrams, manuals,
instructions, [and] software" related to controlled items is also forbidden."3 BIS
would be able to deploy the same procedures to control information transfers
regarding exploiting vulnerabilities in our nation's computer systems.
We concede that using the Wassenaar Arrangement to develop uniform ex-
port controls for cyberweaponry is far from a panacea. The Wassenaar Arrange-
ment is voluntary and lacks strong compliance monitoring and enforcement
measures. Even if the United States changed its CCL to correspond with the Was-
senaar Arrangement's controlled items list for cyberweapons, other participating
nations may not follow suit. Even if they did, they may lack the capability to en-
force export laws on Oday-exploit sales. Although the United States and other
nations routinely enforce export controls of other dangerous data, given the in-
tangible nature of such transactions, enforcement is often very challenging. Since
the market is largely anonymous and geographically independent, export con-
trols may simply drive many sellers underground.
A significant limitation of this proposal is that some major purchasers of
cyberweaponry and perpetrators of cyberattacks, including China, are not mem-
bers of the Wassenaar Arrangement. 14 Given that China is rapidly becoming one
of the most powerful players on the world stage and is a "prolific" sponsor of
cyber espionage, it would be vital to engage China in this initiative. 5 Fortunately,
China has made progress in adhering to the international norms and standards
of other nonproliferation regimes, including the Nuclear Suppliers Group."' Fur-
thermore, since 2004, the Wassenaar Arrangement has held five rounds of dia-
logue with China on export controls for dual-use technologies."' Wassenaar
F.2d 516, 520 (9th Cir. 1978); Elizabeth Lauzon, The Philip Zimmermann Investiga-
tion: The Start of the Fall of Export Restrictions on Encryption Software Under First
Amendment Free Speech Issues, 48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1307, 1349 (1998).
112. See Summary ofFederal Laws: Export Administration Act (EAA) and the Arms Export
Control Act (AECA), CATH. UNIv., http://counsel.cua.edu/fedlaw/eaa.cfm (last vis-
ited Nov. 30, 2013).
113. See JAMES PUTr, CYBER EXPORT CONTROL INVESTIGATIONS (2005).
114. Participating States, WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT, http://www.wassenaar.org/
participants/index.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2013).
115. APT1: EXPOSING ONE OF CHINA'S CYBER ESPIONAGE UNITS, MANDIANT 2 (Feb. 2013),
http://intelreport.mandiant.com/MandiantAPTiReport.pdf.
116. See Xinhua News Agency, China Joins Nuclear Suppliers Group, CHINA.ORG (May
28, 2004), http://www.china.org.cn/english/2oo4/May/96780.htm.
117. The Wassenaar Arrangement, MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF. PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC CHINA,
http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/jks/kjlc/cgjkwt/t577615.htm (last visited Sept.
15, 2013).
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members must continue to build on these outreach efforts and invite China to
participate in their dialogue on permissible sales of 0days."
These shortcomings do not undermine the case for extending the Wassenaar
Arrangement to Oday-exploit sales. This multilateral effort would help foster in-
ternational norms on illegitimate Oday purchases and build international con-
sensus on states' responsibility to halt dangerous sales from within their borders.
Most importantly, multilateral export controls would increase the costs associ-
ated with selling dangerous exploits to those seeking to target critical infrastruc-
ture. Many of the leading gray market firms that sell Oday exploits targeting crit-
ical infrastructure ICS are located in Wassenaar member nations, including the
United States, Malta, and France."9 These firms would now have to apply for
licenses to sell dangerous exploits, move their operations elsewhere, or risk sig-
nificant criminal penalties for contravening export controls and operating on the
black market. For example, intentional violation of the EAR would result in crim-
inal penalties of up to $1 million and prison sentences of up to twenty years.12 0
Such high penalties would likely deter many researchers from engaging in illicit
transactions. Therefore, as part of a broader effort to stem debilitating Oday-ex-
ploit sales, creating uniform export controls through the Wassenaar Arrange-
ment would constitute a critical step forward in safeguarding nations from
cyberattacks.
C. Building a Stronger Prosecutorial Framework to Bring Sellers ofDangerous
Oday Exploits to Justice
Extending the Wassenaar Arrangement to govern dangerous Oday-exploit
sales would be ineffective if researchers could evade punishment when they con-
ducted illicit transactions. Failed prosecutorial efforts would undermine domes-
tic and international export controls, enticing more researchers to enter into this
lucrative line of business. Therefore, building stronger capacity to prosecute
sellers of these exploits both domestically and abroad is pivotal. Once the United
States incorporates the Wassenaar Arrangement's recommended export controls
into its Commerce Control List, it will be able to prosecute violators under the
EAR.
However, to effectively curb sales of Oday exploits, America's prosecutorial
capacity must extend further. A large number of dangerous Oday-exploit sales
us. CNT. NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES, THE WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT ON EXPORT
CONTROLS FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND DUAL-USE GOODS AND TECHNOLOGIES 6
(2012), http://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/wass.pdf.
119. Prominent U.S. firms operating in this market include Netragard, Exodus Intelli-
gence, and Endgame. See Perlroth & Sanger, supra note 4.
120. Schoorl, supra note 105, at 643.
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originate abroad and are therefore beyond the reach of American export laws."'
Furthermore, although the EAR forbids providing dangerous technical data to
foreigners within the United States through its "deemed exports" provision, it
does not prohibit sharing this information with U.S. persons located inside the
country.' U.S. persons, however, may also target the United States with weapon-
ized Oday exploits. The United States must therefore have the capacity to prose-
cute researchers located abroad who sell exploits to U.S. adversaries, as well as
those at home who sell exploits to ill-intentioned Americans.
In order to provide the legal basis for these prosecutions, Congress should
amend the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) to govern dangerous Oday-
exploit transactions.2 ' The CFAA, which has explicit extraterritorial reach, is the
United States' most significant federal computer-crime statute. It prohibits in-
tentional hacking of a government computer,"^ damaging a government com-
puter, bank computer, or other computer affecting interstate or foreign com-
merce,'25 and accessing a computer to commit espionage."' Since courts have
construed "protected computers" liberally to include any computer connected to
the Internet, the CFAA prohibits individuals located domestically or abroad from
knowingly or recklessly damaging the vast majority of computers within the
United States.'2 7
Currently, researchers within and outside the United States who sell Oday
exploits targeting U.S. critical infrastructure to America's adversaries avoid pros-
ecution under the CFAA. This is because they can contend that they lack the req-
uisite intent to gain unauthorized access to U.S. computer systems.121 In their
own words, they are merely selling instructions for penetrating computer systems
121. For a comprehensive description of the scope of coverage of the EAR, see Christo-
pher F. Corr, The Wall Still Stands! Complying with Export Controls on Technology
Transfers in the Post-Cold War, Post-g/n Era, 25 Hous. J. INT'L L. 441, 471 (2003).
122. See Ira S. Rubinstein & Michael Hintze, Coping with U.S. Export Controls 2000,
PRACTICING L. INST. (Dec. 2000), http://encryption-policies.tripod.com/us/rubin-
stein_1200_software.htm.
123. For more on U.S. enforcement of export controls, see Enforcement, DEPARTMENT
COMMERCE: BUR. INDUSTRY & SECURITY, http://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/
enforcement (last visited Sept 29, 2013).
124. Computer Fraud & Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(3) (20o6).
125. Id. & 1030(a)(5).
126. Id. & lo3o(a)(1).
127. See Freedom Banc Mortgs. Servs. v. O'Harra, No. 2:11-cv-01073, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 125734 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 5, 2012); U.S. v. Ivanov, 175 F. Supp. 2d 367 (D. Conn.
2001).
128. Gjelten, supra note 64. For an overview of the statute and of the courts' interpreta-
tions of the required elements of a CFAA claim, see Deborah F. Buckman, Validity,
Construction, and Application of Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (18 U.S.C.A. § 13o),
174 A.L.R. FED. 101 (2001).
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to third parties and the "way the information is used is up to the customer."'29
To rectify this loophole, the CFAA should be amended to impose an affirmative
duty on the seller to conduct due diligence when selling Oday exploits that can
be deployed to gain unauthorized access to critical infrastructure industrial con-
trol systems and their components. Sellers of dangerous exploits should be re-
quired to demonstrate that they "reasonably investigated" the purchaser's back-
ground and had "reasonable grounds to believe" that the purchaser would not
deploy the exploit to attack such industrial control systems. 30 Courts must de-
termine what constitutes a "reasonable investigation" and "reasonable grounds
to believe" in this context. A similar affirmative duty to investigate buyers is
placed on sellers in other weaponry contexts, such as with handgun purchases
from licensed firearm dealers.13' Tavern owners also have a duty under various
statutes and common law to assess whether customers are intoxicated before
serving liquor.'32 Sellers of Oday exploits that target America's industrial control
systems must be subject to similarly stringent standards.
Although some might be concerned that this amendment would contribute
to what they perceive as the CFAA's already "dangerously broad criminalization
of online activity" and abuse of prosecutorial discretion, our proposed amend-
ment is narrowly circumscribed so that only sellers of the most dangerous ex-
ploits that target critical infrastructure would be required to perform due dili-
gence. Because weaponized Oday exploits that target critical infrastructure ICS
may inflict damage surpassing that of a large-scale natural disaster, an affirmative
duty to investigate the buyer's background is reasonable and imperative.'33
Moreover, due to the absence of stable intermediaries in the marketplace for
Oday exploits, holding individual sellers accountable is the only viable pathway
to curtailing and deterring these sales. Some scholars have proposed a "gate-
keeper liability" scheme for other illicit conduct online such as sales of counterfeit
products. In those contexts, there are visible and central intermediaries like eBay
that profit from such behavior and are ideally situated to monitor and halt illicit
129. Gjelten, supra note 64.
130. For similar statutory language requiring an affirmative duty to conduct due dili-
gence, see 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2012).
131. Jennifer A. Wiegleb, Strong-Arming the States to Conduct Background Checks for
Handgun Purchasers: An Analysis of State Autonomy, Political Accountability, and
the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, 48 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 373,
376 (1995).
132. See Boris Reznikov, "Can I See Some ID?" Age Verification Requirements for the
Online Liquor Store, 4 SHIDLER J.L. COMPUTER & TECH. 5, 11 (2007); Lawrence Laz-
zara Jr., Arizona's Dram Shop Law, Avvo, http://www.avvo.com/legal
-guides/ugc/arizonas- dram- shop-law (last visited Oct. 14, 2013).
133. Gonsalves, supra note 28.
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behavior on their sites.13 4 Holding them liable would constitute an effective en-
forcement strategy. 13 The marketplace for Oday exploits, however, is widely dis-
persed, often underground, and lacks visible intermediaries. Since firms like
Vupen sell their dangerous exploits directly to buyers, they must be held account-
able for failing to implement robust screening measures.3
The amended CFAA should empower the United States to prosecute domes-
tic firms that sell Oday exploits to U.S. persons who deploy them to attack critical
infrastructure. Given its explicit extraterritorial reach, the amended statute
should also enable prosecutions of vulnerability research firms located in the gray
market abroad, such as the European-headquartered Vupen and ReVuln. The
United States would be able to justify extraterritorial extension of the CFAA un-
der international law through the protective principle of prescriptive jurisdiction.
The protective principle authorizes a nation to exercise jurisdiction over conduct
outside its boundaries that directly threatens its security or critical government
functions. Vulnerability researchers operating abroad who sell Oday exploits tar-
geting U.S. critical infrastructure to American adversaries sufficiently threaten
U.S. security to warrant protective-based jurisdiction.'3 7
In some cases, the United States should be able to extradite researchers
abroad who have violated the CFAA. This is because the foremost gray market
sellers of Oday vulnerabilities are located in European Union countries that have
extradition treaties with the United States. U.S. indictments could also provide a
much-needed deterrent to vulnerability researchers located in countries that do
not have extradition treaties with the United States. By indicting these researchers
under the CFAA, the United States would prevent them from traveling and con-
ducting business in other countries out of fear of being apprehended by a foreign
government and extradited to the United States.3s
Although the intangible nature of Oday transactions and anonymous nature
of the market would make detection of prohibited sales on the underground mar-
ket difficult, U.S. law enforcement agents could overcome this challenge through
134. Ronald J. Mann & Seth R. Belzley, The Promise of Internet Intermediary Liability, 47
WM. & MARY L. REV. 239, 275-79 (2005).
135. Id.; see Carlos Cortes, Internet Governance Series: Stop Porn, Stop Piracy-the Limits
of Intermediary Liability, LSE MEDIA POL'Y PROJECT (Oct. 7, 2013),
http://blogs.1se.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2o13/1o/o7/internet-governance-series
-stop -porn-stop-piracy-the-limits-of-intermediary-liability.
136. For an illustration of how Vupen interacts with prospective customers directly
through its website, see Receive More Information, VUPEN SECURITY,
http://www.vupen.com/english/sales.php (last visited Oct. 12, 2013).
137. See Paul Stockton & Michele Golabek-Goldman, Prosecuting Cyberterrorists: Apply-
ing Traditional Jurisdictional Frameworks to a Modern Threat, 25 STAN. L. & POL'Y
REV. 1o (forthcoming 2014) (on file with authors).
138. See Siobhan Gorman, U.S. Eyes Pushback On China Hacking, WALL ST. J., Apr. 22,
2013, http://online.wsj.com/artcle/SB'0001424127887324345804578424741
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international sting operations. 3 9 International sting operations have proven ef-
fective at disrupting other forms of intangible cybercrime.140 For example, last
year, the FBI led an international sting operation that disrupted a multi-million
dollar online financial fraud scheme and led to the arrests of twenty-four suspects
in thirteen countries and on four continents.14'
One major disadvantage of sting operations is that they necessitate signifi-
cant resources and time.142 The sting operation described above took two years
to complete.' 43 Nevertheless, even just a few successful and highly publicized op-
erations on the Oday-exploit market would likely compel researchers to think
twice before selling their discoveries to prohibited buyers.'" During each trans-
action, they would worry whether the professed buyer was an undercover law-
enforcement agent and whether their sale would lead to significant criminal pen-
alties under the EAR or CFAA. '4 Such a deterrence strategy has worked effec-
tively to combat conventional terrorism and other types of crimes, illustrating
that the United States does not always need a "cyber-specific" strategy to mitigate
cyber threats such as weaponized Oday exploits. Global sting operations, com-
bined with robust international and domestic export controls, would therefore
help combat Oday-exploit sales that threaten international security.
IV. POLICY ISSUES FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION
Threading through much of our analysis is an underlying policy issue: the
tradeoff for U.S. agencies between the benefits of access to an unfettered market
for weaponized Oday exploits, versus the benefits of clamping down on that mar-
ket. Some have suggested that the United States created the cyberweapons market
139. Jack Goldsmith, Herb Lin on the Market for Zero-Day Vulnerabilities, LAWFARE (Feb.
15, 2013, 7:36 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/02/herb-lin-on-the-market
-for-zero-day-vulnerabilities.
140. See Aaron Katersky et al., Largest Cyber Sting in History Nabs 24 on Four Continents,
ABC NEWS (June 26, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/largest-cyber-sting
-history-nabs-24-continents/story?id=16653993-
141. Id.
142. Goldsmith, supra note 139.
143. Katersky et al., supra note 140.
144. See Goldsmith, supra note 139.
145. For a general overview of these significant penalties, see Penalties, DEPARTMENT
COMMERCE: BUREAU INDUSTRY & SECURITY, http://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/
enforcement/oee/penalties (last visited Sept. 20, 2013); CHARLES DOYLE,
CYBERCRIME: AN OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE STATUTE
AND RELATED FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS 1 (2010), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97
-1025.pdf.
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by being the first to pay extraordinarily high prices for Odays.' 6 They have ac-
cused the United States of "creat[ing] Frankenstein by feeding the market."'4 7
Others have gone so far as to propose that, rather than regulating the supply side
of the market, U.S. government agencies should curb the demand side by relin-
quishing their own purchases of exploits.' If agencies did so, the market would
lose some of its most well-paying buyers,'49 potentially deterring suppliers from
scouring software for vulnerabilities.
Before relinquishing such purchases, U.S. policymakers would first need to
examine the potential costs of doing so in terms of foregoing potentially valuable
information from the exploit market. Some analysts have indicated that if U.S.
agencies halted their exploit-purchasing program, they would be deprived of crit-
ical tools for defending U.S. networks against attack.'50 Law enforcement agencies
would likewise forgo valuable technologies for tracking underground crimi-
nals.'5' But do these agencies weigh these benefits against the potentially cata-
strophic risks that the Oday market poses to U.S. security? We have seen no evi-
dence that they do. The time has come for Congress, Executive Branch leaders,
the software industry, and scholars to bring this tradeoff analysis into the open
and determine whether staying at the extreme end of the policy spectrum-that
of de facto support for a dangerous bazaar for Oday-exploits-best serves U.S.
national security.
CONCLUSION
The United States and the international community are enabling a global
Oday-exploit market to flourish, which empowers terrorist organizations and
rogue states to purchase cyberweaponry targeting our computer networks. In
spite of the dire risk posed by the market, policymakers have failed to provide
any concrete solutions for mitigating the threat. They have either capitulated to
the market's forces, arguing that regulation is futile, or proposed tenuous solu-
tions, such as holding software companies liable for all defects in their products.
146. Perlroth & Sanger, supra note 4; see Zero-Day Market, supra note 38.
147. See Perlroth & Sanger, supra note 4.
148. For a general discussion of the potential "blowback" stemming from the U.S. gov-
ernment's Oday exploit purchasing policies, see Joseph Menn, Special Report: U.S.
Cyberwar Strategy Stokes Fear of Blowback, REUTERS (May io, 2013, 9:47 PM),
http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/05/1o/usa-cyberweapons
-idINDEE949oAX2ol30510.
149. See Zero-Day Market, supra note 38.
150. See Gallagher, supra note 24; Farrell, supra note 57.
151. See A Zero Day Exploit Used for Good?, PCRISK.COM (Aug. 13, 2013), http://www
.pcrisk.com/internet-threat- news/7304-a-zero-day-exploit-used- for-good.
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There is no panacea to this problem. However, pursuing the complementary
policies of incentivizing software companies to invest in robust security, devel-
oping multilateral and domestic export controls, and strengthening prosecutions
of researchers who sell Oday exploits to adversaries would constitute vital first
steps in reducing the market's threat. Even if certain sellers were undeterred from
selling exploits to those who seek to harm us, they would be compelled to spend
more time avoiding detection and less time unearthing dangerous exploits. Fewer
weaponized Oday exploits overall would fall into the hands of U.S. adversaries.
In the long term, the United States and other government participants in the
market must reexamine whether their unlimited access to this market is making
us any safer.
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